

Situational Configuration Causing Riots in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Riots in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers in Indonesia have been widely studied, but most research has only focused on the triggers rather than exploring how and why these riots occur. This study examines riots that occurred between 2001 and 2021, which resulted in significant casualties and material damage. The research investigates eight Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers in Indonesia to uncover the deeper, underlying issues that contribute to the occurrence of riots. Using a qualitative methodology, this study aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the factors leading to prison riots. The findings reveal that the root cause of these riots is deeply tied to corrupt practices within both formal and informal structures in the operational management of prisons and detention centers. Corruption within the prison system, including abuse of authority by officers and exploitation of regulatory loopholes, is identified as a key factor that fuels unrest and creates conditions conducive to rioting. The research highlights the need for systemic reforms to address corruption and improve prison management to prevent future riots. The study's implications suggest that addressing the structural and governance issues within Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers is critical to ensuring long-term stability and reducing the occurrence of riots, thus contributing to the overall effectiveness of Indonesia's criminal justice system.

Keywords: Situational Configuration, Prison Riot, Correctional Institution, Detention Centers.

INTRODUCTION

The results of data processing from literature studies on riot reports at the Directorate General of Corrections, news and previous studies, in the period 2001 to 2021 there were 55 riots both in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers throughout Indonesia. Overall, 55 riots in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers from 2001 to 2021 are difficult to detect and predict for another riot to occur. The most important problem in every riot is the incident as the momentum that triggers the riot. Prison conditions will at least always have the potential for riots. It can even be said to be like a "bomb" waiting to be lit. It can happen anytime and anywhere depending on the triggering factor. No matter how good the prisoners' plans are to prepare for a riot without a triggering incident, the riot will not occur. Because of that, the prisoners will create the necessary triggering conditions. Prison riots are often presented as a good social imagination, as a heroic rebellion of the oppressed or as evidence of the locked "criminal" nature that cannot be fixed. Furthermore (Weegels, 2020) stated that the imagination related to bombs ready to explode is not always true, because the narrative cannot explain the fact that no riots occur in most prison systems most of the time.

Almost all prison riots go through a process that is not simple. The process of forming a riot does not only occur because of one dominant causal factor, but the accumulation of various factors that play a role in the formation of a prison riot. The factors that cause prison riots are not limited to problems in the prison environment and its organization within the scope of the prison walls, but more broadly, the role of individuals, both prisoners, as seen from the density of housing and officers, plays an important role in the continuity of maintaining security and order in prisons. The discussion of how the riots occurred has never been discussed comprehensively. The problems referred to as the causes of the riots were only recorded and used as material for sentencing officers by

the Directorate General of Corrections, the Inspectorate General or the Police. A comprehensive study was never carried out which was used as a measure to prevent and handle riots.

The prison problems that caused the riots were never studied by the influence of macro-government policies. Government policies that are directly and indirectly related greatly affect conditions in prisons. Indirectly related policies such as anti-drug policies, indirectly, prisons will be overcrowded with drug abuse cases, which means that all prisons must be prepared to anticipate problems related to narcotics, starting from how to handle users through medical rehabilitation and social rehabilitation to how drug use is stopped in prison. The discussion of the meso area will explore how the role of prison administrator "sets" the operationalization, starting from basic rights fulfillment services to rights services for well-behaved inmates. Prison administrators in their role in managing prisons formally or informally form a service structure that tends to be corrupt by exploiting regulatory loopholes or facilities that are not prepared by the government. The micro area includes all individual officers, both officials who provide prison management policies and field officers who are close to inmates. Individual inmates also take a role in prison management, either because of officer orders or for their own interests.

Corruption occurs because of abuse of authority or trust by abusing their position for their own benefit or that of others (Barrington, Silverman and Hutton, 2021:46). The Handbook on Anti-Corruption Measures in Prisons (2017, 9) provides an overview of that the potential for corruption that occurs in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers is influenced by the closed nature and impact of imprisonment, creating an environment that not only makes those deprived of their liberty vulnerable to corruption; it can also be a catalyst for corrupt practices and abuse among prison service officers, especially when combined with a lack of accountability and oversight.

The findings of previous studies on prison riots, such as Weegels (2020), suggest that the narrative of prison riots as "bombs waiting to explode" is not always accurate, as many prison systems experience long periods without incidents of rioting. While this study presents a compelling argument, it fails to adequately address the underlying institutional and macro-level factors that contribute to the conditions leading to riots, such as government policies and corruption within the prison system. In contrast, this research takes a more comprehensive approach by exploring the relationship between macro, meso, and micro-level factors, acknowledging that prison riots are not solely caused by internal prison conditions but also by broader systemic issues, including governmental policies on drug control and the resulting overcrowding in prisons. This comprehensive perspective fills a critical gap by analyzing how these various layers of influence interact to fuel tensions and potentially lead to riots.

Additionally, previous studies have examined the causes of riots primarily through a focus on the internal organizational issues of prisons, such as overcrowding and the lack of basic rights for prisoners (Barrington, Silverman, and Hutton, 2021). However, these studies often neglect the role of corruption within prison administrations, which this research emphasizes as a significant contributing factor. Corruption, particularly in the way prison officers manage inmates and exploit regulatory loopholes, has been largely overlooked in past research as a primary factor in the escalation of tensions leading to riots. This study, by focusing on how corrupt practices manifest within the prison system and exploring their role in triggering prison riots, provides a novel criminological perspective that has not been fully addressed in previous literature.

This study aims to find the factors that cause and how prison riots occur based on criminological aspects by exploring the relationship between macro, meso and micro areas in their role in carrying out corrupt practices. From the recording of the first prison riot in 1774 in America in a primitive institution built on an abandoned mine shaft in Simsbury, Connecticut until last 2021, the author only saw how the riot was triggered by problems with fulfilling administrative and substantive services. This study will describe how the riots that occurred in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers were built from corrupt tendencies from the structure formed in the operationalization of services to inmates. This research is expected to provide valuable insights for policymakers and correctional institutions on how to prevent riots by addressing systemic issues such as corruption, ineffective regulations, and government policies. By doing so, this study can contribute to the improvement of prison management practices, ultimately fostering safer and more effective correctional systems.

METHOD

Qualitative methodology is conducted to explore more deeply how riots in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers are formed. Literature studies were conducted to determine the occurrence of riots in Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers in the period 2001 to 2021. The official report of the Directorate

General of Corrections for 2001-2019 showed that there were 36 riots, while the news recap showed 55 riots throughout Indonesia in 2001-2021. The impact of the riot incident is a determining factor in choosing the location and incident of the riot to be studied further.

Research in a study requires various data collection methods, such as individual reports of personal experiences, introspective analysis, interviews with individuals, observations of individuals or several individuals, written documents, photographs, and historical information. Christensen, Johnson, and Turner (2015,16) explain that in many qualitative studies, several of these data collection methods can be used to try to get the best description of an event and the meaning it has for the individual or several individuals being studied. The author uses the triangulation method to get a complete picture of the riots that have occurred previously because some sources missed or forgot to convey several important points in the riots. Donkoh and Mensah (2023, 7) provide a simple description of the purpose of using the triangulation technique, namely "triangulation is used to increase the depth of the investigation by combining multiple investigators, methods, and theories." In-depth interviews were conducted with an approach to prisoners who played a role in the riots and/or prevented the riots must be carried out intensively, in order to gain a complete understanding of the role of the prisoners. Interviews were also conducted with officers, both officers at the implementing level, and prison administrators who determine the running of prison management in accordance with applicable regulations. How prison culture is formed can be obtained from the analysis of interview data with all stakeholders starting from the micro, meso and finally, macro levels, who are responsible for the overall implementation of prison management in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The author limits the conditions of a riot event based on several definitions, including Maitra (2019, 8), who describes that a prison riot is the most explicit display of collective inmate grievances. However, an easy understanding from Useem (2018, 2) is that the hallmark of a prison riot is that the authorities lose control of a large part of the prison and a large number of prisoners for a significant time. The overall understanding of the definition of a prison riot is how the prison loses the authority to manage the prison due to the demands of prisoners for a certain period of time with the impact of casualties and material casualties.

From the limitations and concepts of prison riots, the author processed the literature data and determined that there were 8 (eight) prisons and detention centers that were conducted deeper research based on the impact of the riots. The causes of the prison riots were chosen based on the major impacts related to the loss of control of prison administrators. 5 of the 8 penitentiaries and detention centers studied caused more than 100 prisoners to escape, while the other 3 (three) penitentiaries and detention centers were explored because they had problem characteristics that clearly showed a corrupt structure. The following is the data on the riots that were explored for research:

Table 1. Correctional Institution and Detention Center Riots

No	Date of Riot	Location	Impact			
			Building	Escape	Casualties	Recovery (Day)
1	14/03/2001	Cipinang Correctional Institution	Fire		3	270
2	11/07/2013	Medan Correctional Institution	Fire	212	5	5
3	17/12/2015	Kerobokan Correctional Institution	Damage		2	7
4	23/04/2016	Banceuy Correctional Institution	Fire			14
5	05/05/2017	Pekanbaru Detention Center	Damage	442		20
6	29/11/2018	Banda Aceh Correctional Institution	Fire	113		1
7	16/05/2019	Langkat Narcotics Correctional Institution	Fire	176		14
8	19/08/2019	Sorong Correctional Institution	Fire	258		1

Source: Researcher processed data

In the grouping of the causes of the riots, 3 (three) important areas can be classified, namely in the micro area, namely the individual roles of both officers and prisoners. The most important area is at the meso level, which is the environment and operationalization policies determined by prison administrators. The last area is, of course, the macro area, namely all stakeholders outside the prison.

The role of micro areas

Micro areas are individual abilities of both prisoners and officers that influence the operation of Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers. Educational, economic, social and cultural backgrounds will provide important nuances in all aspects of daily life and interactions between prisoners, officers and prisoners, as well as between officers that have the potential to cause tension that has an impact on disturbing security and order. The analysis obtained from the two riots that occurred at the Medan Class I Correctional Institution and the Kerobokan Class IIA Correctional Institution shows that both riots were motivated by individual or group interests. Wooldredge (2020, 169) describes the existence of individuals in groups of prisoners and how their involvement can vary due to social factors before being in prison. These social influences or statuses may differ while in prison, but psychologically they will renew the effects of prison culture on prisoner behavior. Ramdath et al. (2023, 27) stated that prison culture is determined by the cumulative impact of attitudes and practices in the community of inmates, institutions, interpersonal, and individuals, and affects the security and conditions of the prison environment.

The Medan Correctional Institutions riot became phenomenal because it caused 4 fatalities in the building fire. Two officers, 1 prisoner and 1 visitor and 212 prisoners escaped through the porter's door (main door), including 22 terrorist prisoners. The trigger for this riot was caused by the influence of a power outage due to an explosion of an electrical substation causing the electricity supply to the Correctional Institutions and the surrounding environment to stop and causing the flow of clean water to stop. This situation of no water became a very critical issue because at that time it was entering the month of Ramadan, and in general, Muslims carry out fasting and congregational prayers in the mosque, which are a priority and trigger most prisoners. Power outages had occurred several times before, but on July 11 the power went out from dawn at around 05.00 WIB until just before breaking the fast. The tension began at dawn, and the Correctional Institutions tried hard to find a solution by asking PLN (the state electricity company) to immediately repair the exploded electrical substation, and as a form of negotiation, the process of repairing the electrical substation was shown to the prisoner representatives through the porter door.

The issue that developed at that time was related to the implementation of PP 99 of 2012, which made it difficult for special criminal prisoners to obtain remission rights (reduction of sentence) and integration (conditional release). The issue of the implementation of PP 99 which was the background to the Medan Correctional Institutions riot was not proven when evidence and witnesses were collected after the riot. The facts show that there was no relationship between the riot and the implementation of PP 99 as has been mentioned so far as the cause of the Medan Correctional Institutions riot.

The fact that there is no link to PP 99 is supported by the disclosure of a terrorist convict named Fadli Sadama, who was arrested by the Malaysian Diraja police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on November 20, 2013. From the results of the investigation, the prisoner admitted to being the mastermind of the riots by utilizing power outages and the absence of water supply. Fadli fled to Aceh for a month before returning to Medan and then fleeing to Malaysia. He traveled to Malaysia by fishing boat from Tanjung Balai Port to Kuala Selangor Port, Malaysia. In the neighboring country, Fadli settled in the South Jinjang area. Financing during his escape was obtained from the proceeds of drug sales. From the results of the investigation in the form of news facts and risk mitigation carried out by the source as KPLP at that time, it is known that the strong suspicion of this riot was caused by the desire to control the drug trafficking market, which was then controlled by ethnic Chinese dealers. Batak ethnic dealers wanted to control the market by asking for help from prison officers of the same ethnicity, but to no avail.

Economic and social disparities resulted in a scenario for riots and, according to Olorunmola et al. (2023, 8) in their journal, concluded that the status of prisoners in prison has consequences for individual life chances, namely the chances for prisoners to survive in prison. Furthermore, the desire to control this market was accommodated by a group of terrorist prisoners who at that time numbered

more than 20 people with a scenario of creating riots so that officer supervision was weak, and drug supply was only facilitated by officers who had previously worked together. Another cause of the struggle for the drug market was the actions of corrupt officials in integration services, which caused prisoners to be angry so that they carried out arson and the official was one of two officers who were burned in the registration room.

The riot on 17 December 2015 at Class IIA Kerobokan Correctional Institution was triggered by a disturbance between members of the Laskar Bali and Baladika mass organizations. When there was a visit from members of Laskar Bali, at the same time there was a new prisoner entering the prison who was a member of the Baladika organization, and in accordance with custom, new prisoners were picked up by prisoners who were members of their organization. This Baladika member inmate met with the Laskar Bali group, who were visiting and were considered disrespectful. The riot incident occurred starting at around 14:00 WITA with the stabbing of Putu Sumariana, alias Robot, who was assisted by the Laskar Bali inmates. The riot caused one prisoner to die on the spot, one prisoner died on the way to the hospital, and two people were seriously injured and treated at Sanglah General Hospital.

The author obtained facts from one of the sources that the situation in Kerobokan Correctional Institutions was different when there were prisoners who entered with high status in one of the mass organizations before the riot occurred. The interests of individuals or groups to strengthen the existence of their group were expressed by a prisoner who had the status of Block Leader and was a member of the Laskar Bali mass organization. Even the person concerned was a member of a mass organization called Pulau Dewata, long before Laskar Bali was formed. Although these individual and group interests are efforts by prisoners, the prison administrators have a role in allowing discrimination between groups that causes social conflict.

The 2 (two) prison riots, although it can be confirmed that they were caused by efforts to fulfill the interests of individuals or groups of prisoners, the role of officers is very important in providing facilities or at least allowing the riots to occur. The relationship between officers and prisoners is very vulnerable to corruption as an illicit business, including bribery, smuggling, extortion, and including sexual crimes, treatment that has an impact on physical-psychological health, and violations of honor (Martín Páez et al., 2020: 8). This vulnerability cannot be avoided because of the mutually beneficial relationship between officers and prisoners.

The role of the meso area

Prisons are in a critical position because how to treat them with a security and coaching approach must be weighed wisely, so that there will be no negative impacts on the overall management of the prison. The treatment of prisoners must be balanced and fair in an effort to provide their rights. Injustice will certainly contribute to disruption of security and order conditions in prisons. The meso area discussed in this paper is the internal scope of the prison managed by prison administrators who are understood and implemented together, either following regulations or internal policies imposed by the prison administrators themselves.

The cause of the riots due to the harsh prison regime occurred at the Class I Pekanbaru Detention Center and the Class IIA Langkat Narcotics Correctional Institution. Prison officials' policies strongly shape the prison management regime, which has an impact on prisoners' responses to the regime. Shreeya (2018, 179) in her journal examines the impact of this regime based on institutional theory with the statement that people have different reactions to institutional regimes depending on several factors. Shreeya goes on to say, "This is primarily because inmates do not merely comply with prescriptions and regulations but also seek to engage with these processes in whatever way the context allows. Interaction, no matter how restricted, after all, is basic to social life, whether in the outside world or within institutional confines." The conclusion obtained from the interaction of prisoners with their environment will show that there are "agents" formed to resist the prevailing regime.

The Class I Pekanbaru Detention Center Riot occurred on Friday, May 5, and is thought to have been planned in advance. 505 is the number of planned large-scale demonstrations in the city of Pekanbaru, which automatically focused on handling the demonstrations by the police. The riots began with a fight between prisoners as a trigger and diversion right when the call to prayer for Friday prayers was about to sound and at the same time the fight was handled, the bars of the cells in almost all blocks were shaken by the prisoners and inmates asking to be released for Friday prayers. The Head of the KPR (Prison Security Unit) ordered the release of prisoners and inmates who were going to perform Friday prayers at the mosque, which only had a capacity of 150 people. Because of the Head of the KPR's order,

almost all inmates who were going to perform Friday prayers at the mosque were released and more than 400 people gathered in the field around the mosque. The most wanted officer named Wira was secured inside the mosque. Wira is an officer who is targeted by the inmates because the officer is a supplier of necessities such as mineral water, instant noodles, cigarettes and several daily necessities which, according to the inmates, are sold at high prices. Not only that, every day while on duty, the guard commander often asks for "deposits" from the inmates related to anything related to his duties.

Wira's extreme role in prison management occurs in many other prisons. Scott-Bottoms (2020, 16) in his journal conducted a study at Stanford prison that concluded that prison officers' behavior, which is considered officer discretion, sometimes exceeds what is necessary. The wild conditions in the Detention Center after the riot lasted more than two weeks. This condition is a form of accumulation of the arbitrary application of the management of the Detention Center. The application of "kereng" (close the room) for 24 hours in all rooms except pemuka and tamping is considered very cruel; spending in the block area is allowed if paying the officer. Accommodation of new detainees in the "transit" room, which is supposed to function as a mapenaling room (environmental introduction period), is deliberately filled with more than 100 people.

Not all officers have the same views and perceptions regarding the implementation of their duties. Even policies implemented by a prison officer are contested and protested by other officers, even if they are superiors or subordinates. This is emphasized in a journal studied by Haggerty & Bucerius (2020, 16) with the description that an officer's perception of his colleagues also determines when and how they carry out their work. Inconsistent implementation of the way officers carry out their work is considered by inmates as officers are "hot pockets" because enforcement of regulations can be ignored by other officers.

The riots that occurred on May 16, 2019, at the Langkat Narcotics Correctional Institutions began with a search conducted by Security and Order staff named Agriva Tarigan, who arrested a prisoner on behalf of Ferikato, alias Ajo, in Block T1, Room 17, because he was caught red-handed carrying 6 small packages of methamphetamine (Source report Directorate of Security and Order 2019). Physical violence is carried out by officers starting from Block T1 to the office room in the front building. The arbitrary treatment of Security and Order officers spontaneously ignited the anger of the prisoners. The non-procedural treatment of security and order violators is the main trigger for how prisoners express their anger.

The results of interviews with competent sources showed that the conditions at the Langkat Narcotics Correctional Institutions were very worrying, even several months before the riots occurred. Almost all services for prisoners used costs that were considered not small. The implementation of the proposal for remission and integration did not go well on the pretext that the administration at the Regional Office and at the Center was full of bureaucracy. The convenience provided was in the form of "self-service", namely kiosks to be able to find out information on detention data for prisoners using the fingerprints of prisoners, carried out by asking for a pack of cigarettes or 20 thousand rupiah. Not limited to administrative services, the provision of food became a source of income for the prison administrator. In addition to the poor provision of food, every night the wife of the prison warden brought a cart of fried rice to be sold at a high price. A strong prison regime occurred at the Pekanbaru Detention Center and the Langkat Narcotics Correctional Institutions, which caused prisoners to carry out a major rebellion as a reaction to the regime imposed by the prison administrator.

Both prison riots were the result of a very strong regime with a strong role of administrators who have policy authority in prison management. Dolovich (2022, 155) explicitly states that the responsibility for the implementation of prison management lies with the leadership team because it has the authority to determine the specific policies of the institution it leads. This specific policy must be established because the conditions of correctional institutions vary greatly, so it is necessary to have additional policies at the institutional level according to the needs of each prison.

The causes of the prisoner consolidation riots occurred at the Class IIA Banda Aceh Correctional Institutions and the Class IIB Sorong Correctional Institutions. The problems of the two Correctional Institutions Institutions were concluded by the author through in-depth interviews. It can be seen that the consolidation of prisoners was spontaneous, resulting in collective action from prisoners with the aim of attracting attention because of dissatisfaction with the treatment they experienced, resulting in major riots. Willis (2022, 91) in his journal stated that "Riots by prisoners are one of the most dramatic and spectacular forms of prisoner collective action, frequently resulting in property destruction, injury,

and loss of life, and draw considerable attention and scrutiny from politicians, judges, the press, and many other groups outside the prison."

The facts obtained that the Banda Aceh Class IIA Correctional Institutions riots on November 29, 2018 were still related to the previous riots on January 04, 2018. The riots in January caused the office building to catch fire and until November, the repair of the building was not fully resolved properly, the building next to the porters was still not finished renovating, the burnt walls and burnt doors were only covered using plywood, so it was easy to be damaged and penetrated by hundreds of prisoners. This riot occurred at around 18.30 WIB during the maghrib prayer. The riot began when there were screams in the courtyard of the Correctional Institutions so that the Head of KPLP and the Security Section went down to the field and the prisoners attacked by pouring chili water and beating. The ornamesh fence was broken using barbells and other blunt objects. Hundreds of inmates targeted the port door, but it could not be breached, so they turned to the hall room next to the port, which had not been fully repaired during the previous riot. From this room, the iron partition on the window was broken and 113 inmates escaped.

The indication that the consolidation of prisoners caused the riot at the Banda Aceh Correctional Institutions was due to the collective behavior of most of the prisoners in the prison based on the desire of the prisoners to escape, as the main goal agreed upon by all the rioters. Pais (2023, 60) in his journal said that collective behavior is the result of people gathering whose relationships are not determined by rules and procedures spontaneously and have the same views. In the riot at the Banda Aceh Correctional Institutions, the goal of the prisoners to behave the same was to attack officers and damage the hall building in order to escape.

The riot at the Class IIB Sorong Correctional Institutions on August 19, 2019, which resulted in 258 inmates escaping, was triggered by new throwing from outside the Correctional Institutions at 16:15 WIT, and at 17:00 WIT, it was discovered that the right-hand wall had been broken and the registration room window was damaged for inmates to escape. The burning of the office is suspected of using kerosene from the kitchen adjacent to the location of the stone throwing. The kitchen was looted and damaged to get the kerosene stored for cooking purposes. The main problem of this riot was triggered by provocation from outside the Correctional Institutions, but some information was obtained that some inmates were angry because they did not get remission on August 17. The inmates' annoyance because most of them did not get the promised remission took advantage of the unfavorable situation outside the prison. Collective behavior was marked by the spontaneity of most inmates who at that time had not been locked in their rooms and who took advantage of throwing from outside the prison walls.

The collectivity of the inmates' behavior at that time was aimed at destroying the office and escaping. The agreement of goals among the prisoners was formed spontaneously according to what was stated by Hogg, Abrams & Brewer (2017, 6) in their journal, which stated that strong identification means that social protests go beyond attitude or behavior hesitation and change that hesitation into a sympathetic attitude towards collective action. The real problem is because there is discrimination against the implementation of prisoner rights services. From the results of in-depth interviews with several prisoners and Correctional Center officers, to get service rights, prisoners must give a certain amount of money to officers, 50-100 thousand for remission and 200-500 thousand for integration.

The role of the macro area

The role of government at the macro level contributes greatly to the overall operationalization of prisons. The politics of punishment will directly impact the occupancy rate in the majority of prisons, especially if there are policies due to situational situations, for example, during the Covid-19 pandemic, which must be handled and supported by appropriate policies, not all government policies can be implemented properly at the work unit level. The intervention of authorities which was the cause of this riot is the result of the author's analysis obtained from news evidence, findings in the field and also the results of the triangulation technique of interviews with competent sources. This authority classification is at a level beyond the policies and authority of prison administrators. Lessing (2017, 259) argues that general state responses to crime such as mass arrests and harsher sentences can increase the influence of prison gangs on the streets. At the very least, the government's policy concentration on punishment will have a broad impact on how prisons are managed. Lessing's opinion emphasizes that government policies in law enforcement against certain cases lead to many cases being handled, and crime groups will strengthen these groups in prison.

The Cipinang Class I Correctional Institution riot on March 14, 2001, was the first major riot studied by the author where the handling of this riot took the longest time. The impact of this riot was that none of the prisoners escaped, but the recovery from the riot lasted approximately seven months with the death toll of three prisoners and nine prisoners were seriously injured. The hostage-taking of an officer was part of what made this riot the most serious among other riots. The riot began with the process of transferring prisoners who were not procedural both in terms of the time of implementation and the technicalities of taking prisoners from residential rooms. Provocation occurred because there was a prisoner who returned to the room, which ignited the anger of other prisoners, and the first action taken was to burn the registration office, which was in the Correctional Institutions environment. This riot became big because the keys to the rooms were seized by the inmates and opened almost all the dwellings in the Correctional Institutions. The security guards on duty inside the Correctional Institutions at that time mostly left the place of the guard post to secure themselves. Inmates quickly took control of the entire Correctional Institutions area. Thousands of prisoners were no longer in their rooms and in the early morning the kitchen and hospital were looted by prisoners so that conditions became wild. This riot lasted approximately 7 months with at least 4 riots.

This long-running riot certainly has many underlying factors, so that the change of the head of the correctional institution (kalapas) twice was unable to solve the problem. One of the contributions to the recovery of this riot that was not immediately handled was during an audience with prisoners; there was a statement from the Head of the DKI Jakarta Regional Office, who at that time guaranteed that none of the prisoners would be transferred to another correctional institution. The guarantee that there would be no transfers was not the only reason the riot at the Cipinang Correctional Institution was difficult to handle. Long before the riot, there were several facts showing that the riot that occurred was simply a matter of transferring prisoners that was not procedural. The facts that occurred before the riot were as follows

1. The replacement of the Head of the Correctional Institution almost coincided with the replacement of 3 important positions, namely the Head of KPLP, Head of the Development Division, and Head of the Work Activities Division.
2. Formation of KAWABI (Inmate Committee).
3. The existence of tolerance for the formation of groups, both ethnic and regional.
4. The existence of chicken farming activities managed by prisoners under the name of Ricardo Gelael.

The most influential fact on the replacement of strategic positions is the transfer of positions from Head of KPLP to Head of Work Activities Division. This has an impact on security stability in the correctional institution. The strategic position of the Head of KPLP, which is considered the second position after the Head of the Correctional Institution, has shifted to work activities that have minimal influence. The Cipinang Correctional Institution riot ended with the leadership of the third Head of Prison, Mr. Ngusman, and the Head of the DKI Jakarta Regional Office also changed, so that the support of the Minister of Justice at that time was to take strategic steps in handling the riot. The first step taken was to conduct a large-scale raid with the support of the BRIMOB Polda Metro and also the transfer of prisoners who were considered to be "champions" to other correctional institutions.

The causes of the riots as an intervention of authority at Cipinang Correctional Institutions can be concluded that:

1. Mutation of the Head of Correctional Institution and three strategic positions at almost the same time through a Decree from the Secretary General of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. This has an impact on the continuation of strategic policies from the previous leadership that cannot run well, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Head of KPLP, which creates disharmonious and unconducive conditions from the management of chicken farms in the Guidance Area.
2. The statement of the Head of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of DKI Jakarta which guarantees that there will be no transfer of prisoners as a result of the riots. The implemented policy actually worsened the situation, so that the riots could not be resolved immediately and lasted more than seven months of handling the riots.

The Banceuy Class II A Correctional Institution riot on April 23, 2016, around noon. The searches and interrogations carried out resulted in a riot with the burning of the registration office, KPLP and almost to the port door. The search of 1 (one) external hygiene assimilation person on behalf of Undang Kosim alias Uwa bin Muhadi who allegedly received a package of narcotics in a black plastic bag from a motorcyclist in the area outside the Correctional Institutions and immediately entered the toilet was

known by the upper post officer who saw the incident and reported to the duty commander. New problems arose after an interrogation of Undang which did not produce any results. This investigation became very intense because a few days earlier there was information that there would be methamphetamine entering the Correctional Institutions through the tamping. The interrogation and investigation of Undang caused some KPLP officers to be emotional because it did not produce results, even though Undang was also caught in possession of marijuana 4 months earlier in a joint raid with the West Java Regional Office.

Next, a search was conducted in Undang's room, and a bong (methamphetamine smoking device) and the remaining methamphetamine from use were found. Further examination was conducted on 6 people who were in the same room as Undang, and it is strongly suspected that the owner of the narcotics suspected of being methamphetamine is Agung Kiswanto, a dealer who is in the same room as Undang. The interrogation and examination of the 7 people did not produce results; the confession of the goods that Undang would bring reached a dead end, so the examination was postponed due to the change of shifts of the night guard squad. At around 20:00 WIB, Undang was placed in the cell strap of room 1, and Agung was placed in room 4, which was previously examined by the medical team and declared healthy. At night, around 22:00 WIB, when officers were conducting a round-the-block control, Undang's condition was checked by the head of the security subsection by calling Undang, and he still responded, but after midnight, at 00:10 WIB, it turned out that Undang was hanging on the cell door, which was known by the guard commander. This incident was immediately followed up by the Banceuy Correctional Institutions by contacting INAFIS Polda West Java. This provocation succeeded in forming collective behavior of prisoners starting shortly after the opening hours of the cells at 07:00 WIB, who were suspected of having prepared themselves to make a commotion and went straight to the field. This commotion quickly moved almost all the prisoners in the block, initially only shouting until there was throwing of stones at the office building. Several vehicles in the Correctional Institution, including the Correctional Institution ambulance, were burned after the new throwing and destruction spread to the office rooms, and almost all the rooms in the building were burned. Fire engines and joint TNI-Polri personnel with a strength of 1,000 personnel also helped handle the Banceuy Correctional Institution riot. At around 09.00 WIB the prisoners were forced to retreat to return to their respective cells, but the fire was completely extinguished at around 10:00 WIB.

Various mass media reports and official press releases from the Directorate General of Corrections only provide a chronology of how the riots took place, but the causes conveyed are only how prisoners in the Correctional Institutions expressed anger because it was suspected that Undang died due to torture by officers. However, the results of interviews with several officers showed that there was intervention by the authorities so that the implementation of drug eradication was carried out without proper support and knowledge. The order of the Minister of Law and Human Rights on April 04, 2016, was accompanied by the threat "Anyone who is proven to use drugs, I will fire them on the spot". Nine days later, at the Law Enforcement Training Against Drugs which was also witnessed by all correctional officers through online meeting applications, the Minister of Law and Human Rights stated that many correctional officers had become slaves to drug dealers. "Stop providing comfort in the field. There are still many problems. I ask for two things in prison, free from drugs and free from cellphones".

The orders and threats are clear that Correctional Institutions and Detention Centers must fight drugs, but unfortunately are not accompanied by clear instructions and strategies on how to implement these orders from the Directorate General of Corrections. The management of the Security and Order situation at Banceuy Correctional Institution is not supported by either the leadership or the Kalapas. Several speakers said that the disciplinary punishment imposed was only a silent closure, as evidenced by the fact that Undang had only been caught in possession of marijuana for four months, while registering F as a record of violations was valid for up to 6 months without getting integration rights. The results of the researcher's analysis related to the causes of the riots that occurred at the Banceuy Correctional Institutions were caused by:

1. The order of the Minister of Law and Human Rights regarding the eradication of narcotics, which was not accompanied by detailed implementation instructions and technical instructions, so that implementation at the Correctional Institutions level could not be implemented properly. When problems occurred in the implementation of the order, the management of the Correctional Institutions could not resolve them properly.

2. There was no support from the head of the prison for the implementation of the drug eradication program.

The causes of the riots at the Banceuy Correctional Institutions formed the behavior of officers and prisoners who were not harmonious. The prison culture was not built positively, so the problems that occurred could not be resolved properly. The behavior of prison officers was formed and limited by the prison culture that developed in everyday life. Officers with high integrity will not be able to fight situations that endanger them. Goldsmith, Halsey & De Vel-Palumbo (2018, 17) conveyed the reasons why correctional officers were reluctant to file official complaints, namely:

1. Nothing happens if a report is made, so the efforts made to report are in vain;
2. management tends to tolerate low-level violations, so any complaints are unlikely to be processed;
3. prison management actively discourages employees from reporting alleged integrity violations; and
4. fear of repercussions from fellow workers.

The riots that occurred at the Banceuy Correctional Institutions were the result of central authority intervention by issuing policies but were not accompanied by implementing instructions or technical instructions that could guide prison officers in implementing the policies. The problem was made worse by the lack of full support from the head of the prison to carry out the prison's duties and functions properly.

The second riot at Kerobokan Class IIA Prison on April 21, 2016, was closely related to the 2015 riot. This riot erupted at around 6pm WITA as a result of the detention of the alleged perpetrator of the riot on Tengku Umar Street which was related to the Kerobokan Correctional Institution riot in 2015. After the perpetrator of the riot on Tengku Umar Street was detained by the prosecutor's office, the prosecutor's office entrusted the detainee to Kerobokan Correctional Institution. Official rejection of the detainee of the perpetrator of the Tengku Umar road riot was sent by the Head of Kerobokan Correctional Institutions at that time, but apparently the prosecutor's office still insisted on depositing the detainee at Kerobokan Correctional Institutions. Security considerations in the Correctional Institutions became the main cause of the refusal. The casualties that occurred during the clash at Tengku Umar are certainly an unforgettable memory for the prisoners at Kerobokan Prison. The 11 detainees from Laskar Bali who were deposited were not immediately placed in the block, but were immediately brought back by the Head of Correctional Institution to Denpasar Police to avoid the risk of another riot. The prisoners were brought back by the Head of the Correctional Institutions using a detention car, but the issue that the detainees of the Prosecutor's Office were the perpetrators of the Tengku Umar riot was used by some parties to trigger another riot.

The riots in the two prisons occurred because of policies provided by institutions outside the prison that were detrimental and even made the conditions of the Correctional Institutions not conducive. Government policies must be able to guide the implementation of operationalization in services to the rights of prisoners, including in controlling the potential for acts of corruption (Ahmad & Koya, 2020: 115).

Situational configuration at the macro, meso, and micro levels by finding the relationship between factors in it will provide insight into how prison riots occur and contribute to the theory of how to prevent riots in correctional institutions and detention centers. The situation in the operation of prisons is very vulnerable to the risk of violations and violence due to routine activities that occur continuously every day. Tahamont (2019, 770) sees prisons from the perspective of routine activities that have a combination of situational factors by predicting conflicts and violations. Vulnerability to disturbances of security and order in correctional institutions and detention centers provides opportunities for acts of corruption to be carried out in the operation of prisons. Goldsmith, Hasley & Groves (2016, 5) said that the framework of correctional officers creates opportunities and commits corruption formed within the governance and regulatory system (structure), workplace groups (culture), and political, social, and economic conditions (climate). In order to understand the problems that occur in the 8 (eight) correctional institutions and detention centers research locations, the following is a table of indicators and sub-indicators of the problems that arise:

Table 2. Indicators of Riot Causes

Level	Indicator	Sub-Indicator	Problem
Macro	Government Policy	Punishment Policy	Authority intervention without understanding its implementation

Level	Indicator	Sub-Indicator	Problem
		Stakeholder support	Poor cooperation and communication
		Regulation	Does not regulate technical implementation in prison in detail
	Budget	Building maintenance	Building design does not support the implementation of tasks and functions
	Career Pattern	Job Placement	Changes in important positions in the business process are carried out simultaneously
	Internalization Function	Control	Lack of technical ability resulting in wrong policy decisions
Meso	Service Policy	Service Process	Lack of service transparency due to lack of socialization
	Budget	Budget allocation	Damaged buildings are not repaired immediately
	Operational policy	Operational Structure	Strong Prison Regime Building engineering is not carried out for security
		Structural function	No emergency planning
		Operational Implementation	SOP is not running well No identification of disturbances to Security and Order
	Prison Culture	Control function	Unpredictable prisoner consolidation
		Understanding of culture	Weak environmental recognition Mistakes in handling cultural importation No mapping of culture
		Authority Intervention	Intervention from Inmates in the implementation of tasks and functions
Micro	Technical Ability	Knowledge	Lack of leadership and managerial ability Lack of understanding of tasks and functions based on regulations
		Skill	Improvisation is often done without referring to regulations Unable to recognize potential disturbances to Security and Order
	Corrupt actions	Discriminatory Create conditions	Interests that benefit individuals or groups Complicating administrative matters Complicating the process Intentionally creating uncomfortable conditions
	Social importation	Social identity	The social identity of prisoners is still attached Respect for social identity
	Prison Culture	Degradation of status	The social status of prisoners still has an influence The social status of prisoners is above the social status of officers
		Protection of Officers	There is no protection mechanism for officers

Source: Researcher processed data

Problems at each level are categorized as sub-indicators and indicators that can be understood as a whole problem to be used as a guideline as a form of prevention and handling of the potential for riots. Problems at the macro level have an impact on conditions at the meso level and also at the micro level, which greatly influences the operationalization of daily life in prison. Government policies, budgets, career patterns, and internalization functions at the macro level determine how prison administrators carry out their duties and functions at the meso level. Prison operationalization does not only depend on how administrators determine service policies, budget allocations, operational policies, and the developing prison culture, but is also greatly determined by the micro level, which is the actor in prison

operationalization. Technical capabilities, corrupt actions, social import, and roles in prison culture determine whether the established operationalization policies run well or there are deviations.

Problems at the micro level are influenced by environmental and cultural conditions that develop and are intensely experienced by both prisoners and officers. Research in America by Angelis (2022, 33-34) defines prison as "methods of punishment that inflict extreme isolation and control and manage the tension that they themselves create with threats of further punishment," which creates inhumane conditions. This condition not only affects prisoners and correctional officers; they are also adversely affected by prison conditions. Goulette et al. (2022, 18) stated that officers reported high levels of stress as a result of working in a dangerous environment because they often struggle with role conflict, heavy-duty obligations, poor leadership, and lack of resources in completing their job responsibilities.

In accordance with the description above, the factors that cause riots are categorized into indicators and sub-indicators that can be configured and interrelated. The causes of prison riots can be configured based on the form of conditions formed and also the causes and effects that arise, in accordance with the principles conveyed by Papagiannidis (ed) (2022, 17). Configuration theory is based on three principles:

1. Conjunctural causation: the effect of one condition occurring simultaneously with the occurrence of another condition;
2. Equivalence: any number of configurations or combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome; and
3. Causal asymmetry: the causes that lead to the emergence of a desired outcome may be very different from the causes that lead to the absence of that outcome.

In the context of the causes of prison riots, all three principles apply to almost every riot. Specifically, because of the principle of causal asymmetry, the riot occurred at Banda Aceh Correctional Institution on November 29, 2018. The conditions of recovery from the previous riot with policies intended to improve the conditions of the Correctional Institutions, actually backfired on the prison administrators so that the riot occurred again because the Correctional Institutions did not measure the vulnerability caused by the policy.

CONCLUSION

The author's findings in this study indicate that there are situational problems from each indicator and sub-indicator that are configured, either simultaneously or gradually, and affect the operationalization of correctional institutions and state detention centers. The situational configuration is influenced by corrupt actions at the micro level, structured at the meso level, and there is a tendency to be influenced by policies at the macro level. Corrupt actions that are structured in every service and operationalization of correctional institutions and state detention centers cause riots with material, non-material losses, and even fatalities. This situational configuration lasted for a long time and was not identified by the control function of the Corrections Division at the regional office and the Directorate General of Corrections, so that this condition became an organizational culture

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